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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. 
This case is an appeal from a grant of dismissal in favor of Defendants. This matter 
was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2-2(4). Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j), this Court has appellate 
jurisdiction. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW. 
Issues Presented for Appeal: 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint? 
Standard for Appellate Review: 
The propriety of dismissal is a matter of law, reviewed under a correctness standard, 
giving no deference to the trial court's determination. See Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 
979 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in refusing to order consolidation? 
Standard for Appellate Review: 
A trial court's refusal to consolidate matters is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Hassing v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 159 P.2d 117 (Utah 1945) ("'But if the actions 
were such as could have been consolidated, it was within the discretion of the Court to make, 
or refuse to make, the order. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the consolidation of 
actions, even when permissible, cannot be demanded as a matter of right; the matter rests 
i 
within the discretion of the court, which will not be interfered with, unless clearly abused, 
particularly where the consolidation is denied'" (emphasis in original) (quoting with 
approval from St. George v. Boucher, 21A P. 489, 491 (Mont. 1929)). 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) is the determinative rule implicated by Yanaki's appeal. [See 
Addendum Exhibit "A," which is a copy of this rule.] 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Iomed employed Yanaki from 1992 until 2002. Governing Yanaki's employment at 
lomed was an agreement precluding Yanaki, during or after employment, from disclosing 
Iomed's trade secrets (the "IP Agreement"). [See Record on Appeal ("R.") 2 at f 6.] 
Yanaki enjoyed a successful career at Iomed, eventually becoming lomed's General 
Manager. On February 9,2000, Yanaki received a promotion to General Manager, Clinical 
Systems. His annual salary at that time was $150,000.00, with an annual bonus, a stock 
incentive plan, educational benefits, and health benefits. [See R. 124 at ^ J18.] For example, 
Yanaki entered into an Education Agreement with Iomed which allowed him to obtain an 
Executive MBA at the University of Utah at Iomed's expense. Under that agreement, Yanaki 
promised to repay Iomed for tuition paid on his behalf if he left Iomed voluntarily, which he 
did in January 2002. [See R. 124 at ffif 19-20.] 
At the time of his voluntary resignation, Yanaki had supervisory responsibility over 
the following critical areas of Iomed's commercial business operations: (1) Manufacturing, 
ii 
Quality Control, Design and Engineering; (2) Customer Relations, Marketing and National 
Sales; (3) Product Management and Product Development; (4) Regulatory Affairs; and 
(5) Reimbursement. [See R. 125 at f^ 21.] In his position, Yanaki attended executive 
meetings in which he participated in regular discussions involving Iomed's most confidential 
information, including business strategies, research and development plans, the status of 
ongoing research, confidential communications with Iomed's intellectual property advisors, 
including legal counsel, sales, marketing and financial information. Few, if any, Iomed 
employees had more intimate knowledge of the company's confidential information than 
Yanaki. [See R. 125 at ^ 21.] 
When Yanaki chose to leave Iomed in early 2002, he took with him Iomed's trade 
secrets. Rather than honoring his long-standing obligations under the IP Agreement, Yanaki 
and others took an Iomed invention to Iomed's chief competitor, Empi, Inc., with an offer 
to jointly develop and sell a product incorporating Iomed's confidential information. [See 
R. 134-35 at ff 64-70.] Eventually, an errant e-mail sent to Yanaki's old Iomed e-mail 
address revealed his scheme. [See R. 136-37 at ^ 79-80.] 
Having discovered Yanaki's misconduct, Iomed filed an action on April 9,2002. [See 
R. 42, Complaint.] Shortly thereafter, Iomed sought and received a Court order allowing 
Iomed to seize certain Iomed documents and a computer hard drive located in Yanaki's home 
office, and deposit them with the Court in order to preserve it. [See R. 31 at fn. 1.] 
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In its lawsuit, Iomed sought enforcement of the IP Agreement, as well as the 
Education Agreement, since Yanaki had failed to repay approximately $ 15,000.00 in tuition 
owed to Iomed under the clear terms of the Education Agreement. [See R. 153-54 at ^  169-
77.] 
In response to Iomed's lawsuit, Yanaki brought a counterclaim against Iomed for 
refusing to allow him to compete as allowed under the IP Agreement. [See R. 113-14 at f f 1 -
7.] He also sued Iomed's CEO, Robert Lollini, and its Director of Human Resources, Mary 
Crowther, for defamation. [See R. 115 at fflf 9-11.] Yanaki subsequently filed several other 
lawsuits to pressure Iomed to settle the Original Litigation. Among those lawsuits were two 
federal complaints alleging that Iomed, Lollini, Crowther, and Iomed's legal counsel had 
violated the civil rights of Yanaki and his fiancee in preserving the evidence in Yanaki's 
home office. [See R. 31 at fn. 1.] 
The case now before this Court represents the latest front in Yanaki's campaign of 
litigation against Iomed, its officers, and its legal counsel. Yanaki now alleges that by 
seeking to enforce the IP Agreement in order to protect its trade secrets and seeking recovery 
under the Education Agreement, Iomed somehow has discriminated against Yanaki. [See 
R. 7 at If 26.] 
Because Yanaki's discrimination claims arise out of the same transactions and 
occurrences underlying the original litigation, Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure compelled Yanaki to bring such claims, if at all, as part of his counterclaim 
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against Iomed, Lollini, and Crowther in the original litigation. In particular, Yanaki cannot 
escape the fact that both the Original Litigation and this case focus largely on Iomed's 
attempts to enforce the IP Agreement and Education Agreement. 
Recognizing that this litigation is inextricably intertwined with the Original Litigation, 
the trial court correctly granted Iomed's motion to dismiss this litigation under Rule 13(a). 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. On April 9, 2002, Iomed filed a lawsuit against Jamal Yanaki alleging, inter 
alia, that Yanaki breached an Intellectual Property and Invention Agreement (the "IP 
Agreement") by successfully shopping Iomed's trade secrets to its chief competitor, Empi. 
("Original Litigation") [R. 42-84.] Iomed also alleges that Yanaki breached an Education 
Agreement between the parties by refusing to repay over $15,000.00 in tuition advanced on 
his behalf by Iomed upon his voluntary termination of employment. [See R. 50-51 at f^ f 99-
107.] On December 6, 2002, Iomed filed its First Amended Complaint against Yanaki and 
others. [SeeR. 119-63.] 
2. On September 9, 2002, Yanaki filed charges of discrimination against Iomed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division and the Equal Opportunity 
Commission. UALD No. A2-0836 and EEOC No. 35C-A2-0836. [R. 7 at 127.] 
3. On January 10, 2003, Yanaki filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the First 
Amended Complaint in the Original Litigation ("Answer and Counterclaim"). [See R. 86-
117.] In his counterclaim, Yanaki claims that Iomed breached the IP Agreement by failing 
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to allow him to compete with lomed. [See R. 113-14 at f 1-7.] Not only did Yanaki sue 
lomed, Yanaki also sued lomed's CEO, Robert Lollini, and lomed's Human Resources 
Director, Mary Crowther, for $5 million under a defamation theory. [R. 115 at f^ f 9-11.] 
Thus, in the Original Litigation, lomed, Yanaki, Crowther, and Lollini are all parties. [R. 
86.] 
4. On March 26, 2003, the EEOC completed its investigation of Yanaki's 
discrimination claims, and found that "the information in the file does not indicate that any 
further investigation of your case would necessarily result in any finding of discrimination," 
and issued Yanaki his right to sue letter. [See R. 15.] 
5. On April 14,2003, Yanaki and his fiancee filed two more lawsuits, seeking $ 15 
million from against lomed, Lollini, Crowther, and lomed's legal counsel, this time alleging 
that a Court-approved seizure of incriminating evidence from Yanaki's home office violated 
the civil rights of Yanaki and his fiancee. [See R. 31 at fn. 1.] Judge Dee Benson dismissed 
that action, and Yanaki also has appealed that ruling. 
6. On June 24,2003, Yanaki filed this lawsuit, alleging that lomed failed to allow 
him to compete under the IP Agreement. [See R. 1-15.] His allegations in this regard are 
nearly identical to those set forth in his Answer and Counterclaim. [Compare R. 1-15 with 
R. 86-117.] 
7. In this lawsuit, just as in the Original Litigation, Yanaki also addresses the 
Education Agreement, claiming that it does not require him to repay tuition advanced by 
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lomed, and that lomed's demand for repayment in the Original Litigation violates his civil 
rights under U.S.C. § 1981 and constitutes retaliatory discrimination in violation of Title VII 
and UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106. [See R. 3, 8-10 at fflj 9, 34, 39, and 42.] 
8. In the Original Litigation, lomed claims that Yanaki was a key, senior lomed 
employee who was well-compensated, but chose to voluntarily leave lomed and unfairly 
compete against lomed by using lomed's proprietary confidential information, including 
vendor lists, customer lists, pricing information, and information about a developmental 
product at lomed which Yanaki oversaw in his capacity of General Manager. [See R. 124-25 
at Tflf 19-21.] lomed further alleges that Yanaki carefully prepared for his departure by 
deleting incriminating e-mails, taking key files over a weekend shortly before he left lomed, 
and lying to lomed about his post-employment intentions. [See R. 134-35 at ff 64-70.] 
9. In this lawsuit, Yanaki alleges that the mere filing of the Original Litigation 
constitutes ongoing retaliatory discrimination in violation of Title VII and UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 34A-5-106. [See R. 7, 9-10 at ffi[ 26, 39, 42.] Yet Yanaki admits that he left lomed 
voluntarily to pursue consulting opportunities with two other Defendants in the Original 
Litigation, JRW Technologies and Ceramatec, Inc. [See R. 5 at ^ 16-17.] 
10. As is readily apparent from a review of the Complaint in the Original Litigation 
and the Complaint filed herein, there is nearly complete factual overlap between the claims 
brought by lomed in the Original Litigation and the claims raised by Yanaki in this, his latest 
lawsuit. [Compare R. 7-8 at ffi[ 26-28 and 34 with R. 113-14 at ffil 1-7.] Because of the 
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substantial factual overlap, Iomed moved to dismiss this action under Utah R. Civ. P., 13(a), 
arguing that such claims should have been brought as compulsory counterclaims in the 
Original Litigation. [See R. 26-28.] 
11. The trial court granted Iomed's motion, concluding that there was substantial 
factual overlap between the two matters and that this action and the original litigation were 
inextricably intertwined. [See R. 234-35, Minute Entry, a copy of which is attached to the 
Addendum as Exhibit "B".] The court also based its ruling on the concern that permitting 
parallel litigation of similar legal and factual issues would increase the risk of inconsistent 
judicial findings. [See R. 234, Addendum, Exhibit "B".] 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rules 13(a) and 13(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure divide counterclaims into 
two basic categories — compulsory and permissive. A counterclaim is designated as either 
compulsory or permissive based on its relationship to the opposing party's claim. 
Accordingly, a counterclaim that "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim" falls under Rule 13(a) and is compulsory. On 
the other hand, if the claim does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence which is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim, that claim is not a compulsory counterclaim, but 
may be brought permissively under Rule 13(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 13. 
If a counterclaim is deemed compulsory, then failure by a party to assert it in an 
answer forever bars that claim from being brought in separate litigation. See Slim Olson, Inc. 
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v. Winegar, 246 P.2d 608 (Utah 1952) (failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim precludes 
the party from asserting it in a subsequent action); Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P.2d 839 (Utah 
1955) (a counterclaim not presented to the court on a matter involving the same transaction 
addressed by the original plaintiffs complaint is forever barred); see also Raile Family Trust 
v. PromaxDiv., Corp., 24R3d980 983 (Utah2001) (same); Fox v. Maulding, 112 F.3d453, 
457 (10th Cir. 1997) (same). 
In the case now before this Court, the claims brought by Yanaki arise out of the same 
transactions or occurrences at issue in the Original Litigation. Indeed, Iomed's alleged 
breaches of two of the critical agreements at issue in the Original Litigation - the IP 
Agreement and the Education Agreement - as well as initiation of the Original Litigation 
itself form the fundamental factual bases for Yanaki's claims here. Consequently, the trial 
court properly dismissed Yanaki's claims in this matter because they should have been 
brought in the Original Litigation. 
Yanaki argues that the trial court should not have dismissed at least his Title VII 
claims because those claims had not matured at the time he filed his Answer and 
Counterclaim on January 10, 2003. However, under established case law, Yanaki should 
have asserted his Title VII claims in the Original Litigation and either requested a stay or 
leave to amend. See Wilkes v. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, 314 F.3d 501 (10th Cir. 
2002). 
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Yanaki also contends that his discrimination claims against lomed's CEO, Robert 
Lollini, and lomed's Human Resource Director, Mary Crowther, are not subject to Rule 
13(a)'s compulsory counterclaim requirement because they were not plaintiffs in the Original 
Litigation. Yanaki is simply wrong as a matter of law. 
Rule 13(a) mandates that all claims any party has against any other party relating to 
the same transactions or occurrences must be brought in one action. Here, Yanaki brought 
claims against Lollini and Crowther in the Original Litigation. These claims related to things 
Lollini and Crowther purportedly said about Yanaki relating to his employment at Iomed. 
If Yanaki also had discrimination claims against Lollini and Crowther arising from Yanaki's 
employment with Iomed, he had to bring them at the same time. See AMP Inc. v. Zacharias, 
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5295 (N.D. 111. 1987). 
In the event this Court disagrees with the trial court's dismissal of Yanaki's claims, 
the Court should nevertheless uphold the dismissal under Utah's judicial proceedings 
privilege. This privilege protects all conduct involved in seeking to enforce rights through 
litigation. Here, all of Yanaki's claims hinge upon lomed's decision to enforce its 
contractual rights by litigating against Yanaki for stealing and then peddling lomed's trade 
secrets to its primary competitor, Empi, Inc. Because lomed's conduct is protected by the 
judicial proceedings privilege, Yanaki's claims must fail as a matter of law in any event. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT YANAKFS 
CLAIMS WERE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS THAT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN RAISED IN THE ORIGINAL LITIGATION. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THIS 
LAWSUIT AND THE ORIGINAL LITIGATION ARISE 
LARGELY UNDER THE SAME SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS 
AND OCCURRENCES. 
The best way for this Court to analyze whether the Original Litigation and this action 
arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences is to compare the allegations of 
three operative documents: (1) Iomed's First Amended Complaint in the Original Litigation; 
(2) Yanaki's Answer and Counterclaim in the Original Litigation; and (3) Yanaki's 
Complaint in this case. A review of those three pleadings demonstrates that the key 
documents in each case are the IP Agreement and the Education Agreement. [Compare 
R. 119-162 with R. 86-116 and with R. 1 -11.] Moreover, the critical facts at issue in all three 
pleadings are the circumstances occurring before, during and subsequent to Yanaki's 
voluntary departure from Iomed. 
Courts have repeatedly found in situations similar to the one facing this Court that all 
claims relating to an employment relationship should be litigated in one action. For example, 
in Klein v. London Star Ltd., 26 F. Supp. 2d 689 (S.D.N. Y. 1998), the court found that claims 
of employment discrimination by the employee were so intertwined with the employer's 
counterclaim alleging theft of trade secrets that the claims must be tried together. 
Specifically, the court held as follows: 
1 
Klein claims that he was constructively discharged because of alleged age 
discrimination. Defendants' answer provides an alternative basis for why 
Klein left Star Group's employ—i.e., that Klein left because he knew he would 
be discharged for his theft of Star Group's trade secrets. The counterclaim 
against Klein is based on the same transaction and occurrence that is the 
subject matter of this action as it arises out of Klein's employment with 
defendants and the constructive discharge from his employment Any 
discovery concerning Klein's performance while employed with defendants is 
relevant to this claim and Klein will not be prejudiced by burdensome 
discovery outside the scope of the initial claims and counterclaims asserted in 
this action. 
Klein, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (emphasis added).1 
Numerous other courts agree with this reasoning. For example, in a case involving 
an agreement very similar to the Education Agreement, the court in Baroody v. Bankair, Inc., 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 970 (January 21, 2003), found a counterclaim brought by the 
employer in response to a discrimination claim by the employee to be compulsory. 
Specifically, the employer sought to enforce the terms of a contract requiring the employee 
to repay a loan to the employer upon termination. The employee had argued that because of 
the discrimination, he did not have to repay the loan. See Baroody, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2003, *4. Similar arguments have been raised in this proceeding and the proceeding before 
Judge Medley. 
1
 In his Brief, Yanaki cites to a single case in which it was found that an employer's 
counterclaim for theft of trade secrets was not compulsory in an action by the employee for 
discrimination. [See Appellant's Brief at pg. 16.] However, in that case the employer 
expressly admitted that its counterclaim was entirely unrelated to plaintiffs claims. As a 
result of that concession, the court found that the employer's counterclaims were not 
compulsory. See Spencer v. Banco Real S.A., 623 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
There is no such concession here. 
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Likewise, in Keith A. Keisser Insurance Agency v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company, 2046 F. Supp. 2d 833 (N.D. Ohio 2003), the court considered a motion to dismiss 
very similar to the one brought by Iomed. In analyzing whether claims by the former 
insurance agent against his insurance agency should have been raised as compulsory 
counterclaims in the original action, the court looked at whether the claims arose from the 
same transaction or occurrence. Id, at 835. 
In making its ruling, the court cited with approval the following authority: "Multiple 
claims are compulsory counterclaims where they 'involve many of the same factual issues, 
or the same factual legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic controversy 
between the parties.' Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631,634." 
The court then held as follows: 
I conclude the plaintiffs claims in this case are logically related to the 
defendant's claims in the state court action. They all arise from the parties' 
former relationship as principal and agent. At the core of both sets of claims 
is the contention that the other party breached one or more of their contractual 
obligations to the other. The individual claims, whether state or federal, 
contract or tort, common law or statutory, arise from that relationship and 
share that common core. Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary and their 
attempt to break the nexus between their claims and defendant's claims in the 
state court action are not persuasive. 
Id. Just as in the Keisser matter, here Yanaki attempts to bring statutory claims 
independently of a large ongoing litigation matter in which nearly the entire employment 
relationship between Yanaki and Iomed is at issue, and in which the dispositive agreements 
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between the parties, the IP Agreement and the Education Agreement, form the fundamental 
bases for each parties' claims against the other in each of the two separate legal proceedings. 
In commenting on the public policy reasons for not allowing the plaintiff in that 
matter to do what Yanaki seeks to do here, the court in Keisser made the following comment: 
In addition . . . the need to avoid inconsistent adjudications [and] 
considerations of judicial economy would lead to the same conclusion. Each 
suit involves construction of the corporate agency agreement and other 
contractual understandings between the parties. Whenever two courts look at 
the same contract, differing interpretations are possible, even if not likely. 
Even if both courts read the contract in the same way, one of them will have 
spent its time doing so unnecessarily. This is the sort of exercise that the 
compulsory counterclaim rule seeks to avoid, just as it also seeks to prevent 
inconsistent outcomes. 
Id. at 836. The court also noted that "[c]laims have also been deemed to be compulsory 
where, as here, they arise from the parties' former occupational relationship. Thus, in 
Morgan Adhesives Inc. v. Datchuk, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 8, 2001 WL 73 83, *2 (Ohio 
App.), the court held that a former employee's claims for handicap discrimination and 
retaliation were compulsory counterclaims in his former employer's suit for fraud and 
falsification." Id. 
It would be patently unfair for Yanaki to be allowed to litigate nearly identical claims 
based on identical facts with the apparent hope that he may prevail in one of the two forums. 
In particular, it would be unfair to force Iomed to continue to expend additional resources 
to defend Yanaki's claims about the IP Agreement and the Education Agreement in the 
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counterclaim in the Original Litigation as well as in this matter, which is really the identical 
claim dressed up in the guise of a discrimination claim. 
2. IOMED DID NOT WAIVE ITS COMPULSORY 
COUNTERCLAIM DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE 
THE UALD AND EEOC. 
Yanaki argues that Defendants cannot move to dismiss this Complaint because Iomed 
did not raise the compulsory counterclaim argument in earlier proceedings before the UALD 
ortheEEOC. Defendants' assertion of a Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim defense would 
not have been relevant or appropriate to bring in the UALD or EEOC proceedings. Iomed's 
responses to the UALD and EEOC claims focused, as they should have, on the factual 
allegations of Yanaki's claims, not the procedural requirements of a subsequent court action. 
Consequently, Iomed cannot be found to have somehow waived its right to bring a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 13(a). 
3. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED YANAKTS 
TITLE VII CLAIMS. 
Yanaki argues that his Title VII claim cannot be included in the compulsory 
counterclaim requirement because it was not a mature claim at the time Iomed initiated the 
Original Litigation. While Yanaki is correct that he was required to receive the right to sue 
letter before he could pursue his claim in court, he should have asserted a "placeholder" 
claim in the Original Litigation. 
The case of Wilkes v. Wyoming Dep 't of Employment, 314 F.3d 501 (10th Cir. 2002) 
provides helpful precedent in this regard. In Wilkes, plaintiff filed suit against her former 
5 
employer for equal pay under section 206(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. That claim 
was resolved though an offer of judgment. She later filed a second lawsuit based on gender 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The employer moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, arguing that the facts giving rise to both the first and second claims for relief were 
properly defined as the employment relationship, and that the Title VII claims should have 
been brought, if at all, in the prior lawsuit. Plaintiff argued, just as Yanaki does here, that 
her Title VII claims could not have been brought in the first action because she had not 
received her right to sue letter from the EEOC at the time she filed the first lawsuit. 
Rejecting this argument, the trial court found that plaintiff should have brought the Title VII 
claim in the first action and requested a stay until exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Wilkes, 314 F.3d at 505. The appellate court agreed, affirming that the Title VII claims were 
barred because they had not been raised in the prior action. 
Further, there is no doubt that Yanaki was aware of the facts giving rise to potential 
claims of discrimination long before he filed his Answer and Counterclaim on January 10, 
2003. Indeed, some four months earlier, Yanaki had brought allegations of discrimination 
to the UALD and the EEOC. 
Where a litigant is aware of such facts, the compulsory counterclaim rule bars 
subsequent litigation based on such facts. For example, in Crutcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 746 
F.2d 1076, 1080 (5th Cir. 1984), the appellate court ruled as follows: 
The district judge held the facts which formed the basis of Crutcher's tort claim 
rendered it a compulsory counterclaim that Crutcher was required to raise in the 
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earlier guarantee lawsuit with Aetna (first case) since the facts were known to him at 
that time. As a result, the district court dismissed the claim as barred under Rule 
13(a). We agree. Failure to bring a compulsory tort counterclaim in an action on the 
contract will bar a later independent action on the tort. Cleckner v. Republic Van and 
Storage Co., 556 F.2d 766 (5th Cir.1977). 
Moreover, the trial court in this matter dismissed Yanaki's claims without prejudice, 
allowing Yanaki to seek leave to amend his counterclaim in the Original Litigation. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d) ("A claim which . . . matured after serving his pleading may, with the 
permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading."). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED CLAIMS AGAINST 
LOLLINI AND CROWTHER. 
Yanaki incorrectly argues that his claims against Iomed's CEO, Robert Lollini, and 
its Human Resources Director, Mary Crowther, should not have been dismissed because 
Lollini and Crowther were not plaintiffs in the Original Litigation. This argument fails as 
a matter of law. 
Rule 13(a) requires that all claims between and among parties in litigation arising out 
of the same transactions or occurrences be brought in one action. Yanaki himself brought 
claims in the Original Litigation against Lollini and Crowther for defamation arising out of 
Yanaki's employment with Iomed. [See R. 113-15.] Here, Yanaki brings claims against 
Lollini and Crowther for discrimination, also arising out of Yanaki's employment with 
Iomed. In such circumstances, it is proper to dismiss this action because his discrimination 
claims against Iomed, Lollini, and Crowther had to be brought in the Original Litigation. 
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A similar situation arose in AMP Inc. v. Zacharias, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5295 (N.D. 
111. 1987) (applying Federal Rule 13(a)). Like this case, AMP involved a dispute over 
conduct surrounding trade secrets. There, Precision sued AMP in Florida. Later, AMP sued 
Precision in Illinois, and also sued certain corporate officers of Precision and another entity. 
Precision moved to dismiss the Illinois action under Rule 13(a), contending that AMP should 
have brought the claims against the individuals in the Florida action. In response, AMP 
argued that Rule 13(a) was not applicable to claims against the individual defendants because 
they were not parties to the Florida action. The Court disagreed, ruling that: 
Rule 13(a) contemplates that a compulsory counterclaim might contain issues not in 
the original action and might involve additional parties.... Further, Rule 13(a) is not 
limited in its application to original parties, but is applicable to parties brought 
in subsequent to the filing of the original action. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, § 
13.02 (1985). In fact, subdivision 13(h) contemplates the situation where additional 
parties are required for the granting of complete relief in determination of the 
counterclaim (A sues X and Y, X counterclaims against A and B and C). In the 
instant case, AMP has brought an action against Precision, a plaintiff in the Tampa 
suit, and against four additional defendants, each of whom is an officer or key 
employee of the corporate plaintiffs in the Tampa case. 
The paramount concern under Rule 13(a) is judicial economy. The Court 
should not apply Rule 13(a) woodenly, but should interpret it liberally so as to allow 
the joinder of all related claims. 
AMP, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5295 at *7-*8. 
Under the same analysis, and for the same policy reasons, this Court should not 
reverse the trial court's determination that all claims, including claims against Lollini and 
Crowther, should have been brought in the Original Litigation. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO ORDER CONSOLIDATION. 
Yanaki contends that the trial court should have consolidated the two cases rather than 
dismissing this action. The trial court's refusal to consolidate is granted substantially more 
deference than its ruling to dismiss. Hassing v. Mutual Life Ins, Co., 159 P.2d 117 (Utah 
1945). Here, the trial court decided to dismiss Yanaki's claims without prejudice, giving 
Yanaki the opportunity to attempt to replead the claims in the Original Litigation, where they 
should have been brought, if at all. Yanaki correctly points out that the court in the Original 
Litigation could choose not to allow amendment of the Answer and Counterclaim, because 
the deadline for amending pleadings is long past. However, were it otherwise, a litigant 
could always seek to evade such deadlines in litigation by filing claims in a subsequent 
lawsuit which should have been brought in earlier litigation. 
In addition, courts have long ruled that where a claim is dismissed under Rule 13(a), 
an alternative request for consolidation is rendered moot in any event. See, e.g., Stewart v. 
Petzold, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24920 (M.D. N.C. 2001). 
D. THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE DISMISSED THE ACTION 
UNDER THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE. 
In the proceedings below, Iomed also argued that Yanaki' s claims should be dismissed 
because they rested largely on Iomed's decision to litigate against Yanaki for breaching the 
IP Agreement and the Education Agreement. Even if this Court were to find that the claim 
was not properly dismissed under Rule 13(a), the Court could uphold the dismissal based on 
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Utah's recognized judicial proceedings privilege. Judgment in Iomed's favor may be 
affirmed: 
If it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent from the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis 
of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged 
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was considered 
or passed on by the lower court. 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10 (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Tf 18); see also 
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 23 n.8 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court need 
not confine itself to affirming the trial court on the basis of the argument relied upon below. 
Each of Yanaki's three claims for relief rests on the premise that Iomed discriminated 
against him by pursuing legal action for misappropriation of Iomed's trade secrets. However, 
Iomed cannot be found to have discriminated merely because it seeks to enforce its legal 
rights under contracts with Yanaki. Such conduct is protected by the judicial proceedings 
privilege. See Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003). 
Following the trial court's minute entry, Yanaki's counsel sought to include in the 
final Order a holding rejecting Iomed's claim of protection under the judicial proceedings 
privilege. [See R. 248-50.] The trial court rejected this proposed amendment. [See R. 240-
41.] 
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VIII. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision to dismiss this action should be 
upheld. 
DATED this I* day of January, 2005. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Clark Waddoups 
Jonathan O. Hafen 
Justin P. Matkin 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (j -" day of January, 2005,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed by first class U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
David W. Scofield 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Hoole 
HOOLE & KING 
4276 South Highland Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
99883 
ADDENDUM TO 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Tab A 
49 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 
charges of water district, plaintiff waived thir-
ty-day limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by 
failing to plead it in answer to defendant's 
counterclaim. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 
Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962). 
The statute of limitations defense must be 
pleaded as an affirmative defense in a respon-
sive pleading, or it is waived, unless an 
amended pleading asserting the defense is al-
lowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 
15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irriga-
tion Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Keller v. 
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 
(Utah 1998). 
—Waiver. 
Where plaintiff sought to rescind a contract 
to purchase a business from defendant on 
ground that the agreement was procured by 
fraud, and defendant claimed that any fraud 
had been waived by plaintiffs continued oper-
ation of the business, the allegation of waiver 
was an affirmative defense which should have 
been pleaded, and failure to do so constituted a 
waiver of the defense under this rule. Bezner v. 
Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 
(Utah 1976). 
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah 
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Tbwn of 
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 
57,305 P.2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable life 
Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P.2d 924 
(1968); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 
1980); Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 
1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah 
1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 
(Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Const*. Co. V.Lei-
sure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
754 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Arrow Iiidtis., Inc. v, 
Zions First Natl Bank, 767 P.2d 935 .(Utah 
1988); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 
668 (Utah 1989); Weber v. Snyderville West, 
800 P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 
815 P2d 241 (Utah 1991); Moffitt v. Barr, 837 
P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v. W l e y 
Mtg. Co., 835 P.2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993); Richards Irrigation Co. v. 
Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cruz v. 
Middlekauff lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 
1252 (Utah 1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek 
Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); Valley 
Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 R2d 
361 (Utah 1997); Harper v. Summit County, 963 
P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, granted, 
982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1999); Busche v. Salt Lake 
County, 2001 UT App 111, 26 P.3d 862; United 
States v. Smith, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D. Utah 
2002); IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., 2003 
UT 5, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 73 R3d 320. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur.SkL — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 46 et 
seq., 86; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et 
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237, 
280, 389 et seq. 
OJ.S- — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136, 
138, 143, 144, 162 et seq., 173; 27 C.J.S. Dis-
missal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 C.J.S. Pleading 
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116,121 to 129,264 to 268, 
424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to 586. 
A.L.R.—Right to voluntary dismissal of civil 
action as affected by opponent's motion for 
summary judgment, judgment on the plead-
ings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
What, other than affidavits, constitutes ''mat-
ters outside the pleadings," which may convert 
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedyre 
12(b), (c) into motion for summary judgment, 2 
A.L.R. Fed. 1027. 
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or 
13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with 
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as 
waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388. 
Necessity of oral argument on motion for 
summary judgment on pleadings in federal 
court, 105 AX.R. Fed. 755. 
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims, A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its 
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the 
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or 
(2) the opposing party brought suit upon his cl^im by attachment or other 
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under 
this Rule 13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim ahy 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or-occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. 
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(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not 
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim 
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading 
of the opposing party 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either 
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with 
the, permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental 
pleading, 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(f) Cross^claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any 
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a 
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of 
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party 
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other 
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief 
in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order 
them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction 
of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be 
rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the 
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross demands 
have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had 
brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up, the 
two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and 
neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the 
other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to 
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, 
dounterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an 
assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted 
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- Cross-References. — Holder in due course, 
ment deleted former Subdivision (k), providing §§ 70A-3-305, 70A-3-602. 
for disposition of a counterclaim, cross-claim, or Rights of one not holder in due course, § 70A-
third-party claim in excess of the court's juris- 3-306. 
d i <£ i o n* ., . „, ~ , , , , ^ x Security interests, assignment, § 70A-9a-403 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (h)
 e j . se<1 
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule 13, 
F R A P . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Claims against assignee. —Requirements. 
—Contractual alteration of rights. Cross-claim. 
Compulsory counterclaim. — Offset. 
—Failure to plead. Promissory notes, 
—Not in smitl claims court. —Prerequisite, 
—Not proper. Prior judgment, 
—Opposing party's claim. —Timeliness. 
—Party not in interest. —Under Liability Reform Act. 
—Proper. Jurisdiction. 
—Purpose. —Appellate. 
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—Federal. 
Omitted counterclaim. 
—Newly discovered. 
Permissive counterclaim. 
—Dismissal of related pending action. 
Separate judgments. 
—Effect of remand. 
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim. 
Cited. 
Claims against assignee. 
—Contractual alteration of rights. 
Subdivision (j) does not abrogate the rights of 
parties to contract freely with respect to their 
rights and remedies upon assignment. 
Lundstrom v. RCA, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P2d 
339 (1965). 
Compulsory counterclaim. 
—Failure to plead. 
Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim 
precludes the party from asserting it in a sub-
sequent action. Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 122 
Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952). 
A counterclaim not presented to the court on 
a matter involving the same transaction ad-
dressed by the plaintiff's complaint is forever 
barred. Tbdaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 404, 285 
R2d 839 (1955). 
Where defendant's counterclaim was compul-
sory because it arose out of the transaction that 
was the subject matter of plaintiffs claim, his 
failure to file a counterclaim resulted in a 
waiver of the claim. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 
P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiffs, who had been defendants in an 
earlier related action, had the obligation under 
Subdivision (a) to raise any available counter-
claims arising out of the same transaction, and 
because they failed to raise available counter-
claims as defendants, they waived the right to 
raise those same claims in a separate action. 
Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 
UT 40, 24 P3d 980. 
Parties could not evade the dictates of Sub-
division (a) by arguing that they had acted as 
individuals in the prior related action, but as 
trustees in the case at bar, after they had 
asserted affirmative defenses on behalf of the 
trust in the prior action rather than moving for 
dismissal for failure to join an indispensable 
party. Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 
2001 UT 40, 24 P.3d 980. 
—Not in small claims court. 
Within the limited jurisdiction of the small 
claims court, a defendant is not compelled to 
bring a counterclaim though it may arise from 
the same transaction or occurrence as the sub-
ject matter sued on Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 
1372 (Utah 1986). 
—Not proper. 
In action by government to condemn parcel of 
land, counterclaim by part owner of parcel for 
damage to adjoining parcel as result of condem-
nation of first parcel was not compulsory under 
Subdivision (a) and could be pleaded as an 
amendment to owner's original answer under 
Subdivision (e). State ex rel. Eng,g Comm'n v. 
Bird & Evans, Inc, 1 Utah 2d 276,265 P.2d 639 
(1953). 
—Opposing party's claim. 
The opposing party's claim mentioned in 
Subdivision (a) refers only to the claim of the 
opposing party against the party who has the 
counterclaim, not a claim that the opposing 
party has against a third person. State ex rel. 
Eng^g Comm'n v. Bird & Evans, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 
276, 265 P.2d 639 (1953). 
—Party not in interest. 
If named defendants belieye that they are not 
the correct parties in interest and therefore 
cannot raise counterclaims, they must defend 
on that ground and place all parties and the 
court on notice of that defense. Raile Family 
Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 UT 40,24 P.3d 
980. 
—Proper. 
Portion of open account consisting of charges 
for parts used in installing oil sump constituted 
a compulsory counterclaim in debtor's negli-
gence claim against creditor for injuries result-
ing from faulty installation of oil sump, and 
could not be obtained in subsequent action by 
creditor. Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 122 Utah 
80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952). 
—Purpose. 
The purpose of Rule 13(a) is to ensure that all 
relevant claims arising out of a given transac-
tion are litigated in the same action. Raile 
Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 UT 40, 
24 P.3d 980, 
—Requirements. 
A counterclaim that requires a certain adju-
dication of the plaintiffs main claim for accrual 
is not a proper counterclaim; a counterclaim 
that requires proof of a fact, which fact is also a 
necessary part of the plaintiff's main claim, is a 
proper counterclaim. Salt Lake City v. Utah 
Lake Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14,286 P.2d 773 
(1955). 
Cross-claim. 
—Offset. 
Promissory notes. 
A claimant on promissory note is entitled to 
an offset from the amount claimed by a cross-
claimant against her on another note, even if 
the statute of limitations has expired as to 
claims on the entire amount due under the 
notes. Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 
1985). 
—Prerequisite. 
Prior judgment. 
Under Subdivision (f), it is no longer neces-
sary that the liability sued upon in the cross-
claim must first have become fixed by a judg-
ment as at common law. Stanley Title Co. v. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 26 Utah 2d 121, 
485 P.2d 1400 (1971). 
—Timeliness. 
The cross-claim, to the extent that it sought 
contribution for sums the insurance company 
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paid in defending the plaintiff, related back to 
the date of the filing of the original complaint 
and was therefore timely filed. Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas, & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1997). 
—Under Liability Reform Act. 
The effect of the Liability Reform Act in 
prohibiting contribution claims requires joint 
tortfeasor codefendants to raise cross-claims 
against each other in the underlying tort action 
or else such claims may be lost, and, even 
though this conflicts with Subdivision (f), the 
Act controls for the purpose of preserving sub-
stantive rights thereunder. National Serv. 
Indus., Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., 937 P.2d 
551 (Utah C t App. 1997), cert, granted, 945 
P.2d I l i a (Utah 1997). 
. The state liability reform act, §§ 78-27-37 to 
78-27-43, prohibits an apportionment claim 
from being brought outside the underlying tort 
action, and the apportionment claim must 
therefore be brought as a cross-claim in the 
underlying suit if it is not to be lost. Corpora-
tion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Queen Carpet 
Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Utah 1998). 
Jurisdiction. 
—Appellate. 
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.R 54(b), ap-
plies when the trial court orders a separate 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, and failure to have the case 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving 
issues and parties before that court, will de-
prive the appellate court of jurisdiction over an 
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 R2d 298 
(Utah 1991). 
—Federal. 
Trial court, in a stockbroker's action against 
its customer for damages resulting from the 
customer's failure to deliver a stock certificate, 
has no jurisdiction to hear the customer's coun-
terclaim alleging violations of federal securities 
statutes and rules, all of which came under 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Western Capital 
& Sec., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 R2d 989 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). 
Omitted counterclaim. 
—Newly discovered. 
In personal injury action in which defen-
dant's insurer was furnishing lawyer to defend 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Counter-
claim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 1 et seq.; 20 
Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 120; 59 Am. Jur. 2d 
Parties § 188 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 182 to 186. 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 66; 50 C.J.S. 
Judgments § 684; 67A C.J.S. Parties §§ 88 to 
110; 71 C.J.S Pleading §§ 167 to 176; 80 C.J.S. 
Setoff and Counterclaim §§ 1 et seq., 13,27,36, 
54. 
AJL.R. — Bank's right to apply or set off 
deposit against debt of depositor not due at 
insured and lawyer had not met defendant 
until just before taking his deposition and 
therefore did not know that defendant had 
injuries and believed plaintiff to have been at 
fault, refusal to allow amendment of answer to 
include counterclaim was an abuse of discretion 
since case was one where justice requires'' 
amendihent. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 
165* 486 P.2d 1045 (1971). 
Permissive counterclaim. 
—Dismissal of related pending action. 
Where mortgagee brought action to foreclose 
on one of two mortgages and mortgagor at that 
time had an action pending against the mort-
gagee concerning the same mortgages, it was 
within the court's discretion to dismiss the 
mortgagor's action since the mortgagor could 
raise any claim he had against the mortgagee 
by counterclaim in the foreclosure suit. 
Blomquist v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 17 
Utah 2d 381, 412 P2d 914 (1966). 
Separate judgments. 
—Effect of remand. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
ment on cross-claim and counterclaim would be 
subject, on remand, to revision since all claims 
presented had not been adjudicated and since 
trial court made no express determination as 
required by Rule 54(b). M & S Constr. & Eng'g 
Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139, 
467 P.2d 410 (1970). 
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying motions to allow a counterclaim and to 
bring in third party defendants which were 
filed 13 months after an answer to the com-
plaint was filed and two weeks before the 
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the 
untimely motion were inadequate and where 
the parties failed to demonstrate that the 
court's denial of the motions resulted in preju-
dice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
Cited in Lincoln Fin. Corp. v. Perrier, 567 
R2d 1102 (Utah 1977); Hood v. Layton, 751 P.2d 
1141 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Parkdale Care Ctr. 
v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
time of his death, 7 AL.R.3d 908. 
Proceeding for summary judgment as af-
fected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Presentation of claim to executor or adminis-
trator as prerequisite of its availability as coun-
terclaim or setoff, 36 A.L.R.3d 693. 
Right of party-litigant to defend or counter-
claim on ground that opposing party or his 
attorney is engaged in unauthorized practice of 
law, 7 A.L.R.4th 1146. 
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim 
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53 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 
for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in 13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with 
same proceeding in which abuse occurred — jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as 
state cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1115. waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388. 
Who is an "opposing party" against whom a Effect of filing as separate federal action 
counterclaim can be filed under Federal Civil daim that would be compulsory counterclaim 
Procedure Rule 13(a) or (b), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 815.
 m pending federal action, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 240. 
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or 
Rule 14. Third-party practice. 
(a) When defendant may bring in third party. At any time after commence-
ment of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a 
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action 
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him. 
The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files 
the third-party complaint not later than ten days after he serves his original 
answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to 
the action. The person served with the summons and third-party complaint, 
hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the 
third-party plaintifFs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims 
against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party 
defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert 
against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the 
plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against 
the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the plaintifFs claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff 
may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim 
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon 
shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and 
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed 
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be 
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the 
third-party defendant. 
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. When a counterclaim is asserted 
against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under 
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 14(a) and (b), F.R.C.R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Appellate jurisdiction. impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the 
Third party by defendant. defendant in the initial action does so, not on 
—Grounds. the ground that a claim for relief then exists 
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim. against the third-party defendant, but on the 
Cited. ground that the third-party defendant "may be 
liable" to the defendant in the principal action. 
Appellate jurisdiction. Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.P. 54(b), ap- 1344 (Utah 1984). 
plies when the trial court orders a separate
 T T A . , 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or U S * T e - y , m 0 t i ° ? J ° ^ W ~ ! m * ? r o l ? , n - . 
third-party claim, and failure to have the case . ^ t n a l court <hd not abuse its discretion in 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving denymg motions t o ^ o w a counterclaim and to 
issues and parties before that court, will de J ™ * ™ ^ p a r t y d e f e n d a n t s fh£h w e r e 
: ,v 11 x ^ r- • J- x- filed 13 months after an answer to the com-pnve the appellate court of jurisdiction over an , . .
 m , , , , , f ,, 
SffkS? S e C ' B a n k V' C O n l i n ' 8 1 ? R 2 d ^ SSulId trSl date Sere " t i for £ 
'" untimely motion were inadequate and where 
Third party by defendant. t n e parties failed to demonstrate that the 
court's denial of the motions resulted in preju-
—Grounds. dice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. 
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor App. 1987). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMAL YANAKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
IOMED, INC., a Utah 
corporation, ROBERT J. LOLLINI 
and MARY CROWTHER, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 030914206 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
January 5, 2004 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral argument 
with respect to the motion on December 5, 2004. Following the 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for 
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
After reviewing the pleadings submitted in this matter, it 
is clear the current action arises largely from the same series 
of transactions and occurrences as those underlying Iomed's 
original lawsuit against Yanaki and others (specifically, the IP 
Agreement and Education Agreement). Moreover, although not 
mirror images of each, the claims all center around the former 
occupational relationship. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court is persuaded the causes 
of action are so intertwined that the risk of inconsistent 
rulings is present if this action is allowed to proceed in its 
present form. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted with 
certain limitations. Specifically, dismissal is without 
prejudice and under the circumstances, the Court is not persuaded 
fees are appropriate. Consequently, this request is denied. 
DATED th i s _ ^ ay of January, 2004 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
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